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COLOR OF TITLE.
I. Definition and Nature of Color of Title.-Color of title to
land is that which, in appearance, has all the requisites and
characteristics of title, but which, in reality, by reason of some
defect, fails to convey the lawful title: Wright v. Mfattison, 18
How. 56; Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 466; Walls v. Smith, 19 Ga.
8; Veal v. Bobinson, 70 Id. 809. In Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 Ill.
392, the court say: "Any instrument having a grantor and
grantee, and containing a description of the lands intended to be
conveyed, and apt words for their conveyance, gives color of title
to the lands described. Such an instrument purports to be a con-
veyance of the title, but because it does not, for some reason, have
that effect, it passes only color or the semblance of a title. It
makes no'difference whether the instrument fails to pass an absolute
title because the grantor had none to convey, or had no authority
in law or in fact to convey one, or whether such want of authority
appears on the face of the instrument or aliunde. The instrument
fails to pass an absolute title for the reason that the glantor was
not possessed of some one or more of these requisites, and therefore
it gives the semblance or color only of what its effect would be if
they were not wanting."
There is an important distinction between claim of title and color
of title. The possession of one who has a colorable title is co-
extensive with the boundaries of the instrument under which he
claims, in the absence of any actual possession by the true owner;
whereas the possession of one entering and holding under a mere
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claim of title is confined to the land in his actual occupation:
Creekmur v. Greelemur, 75 Va. 430. In other words, if one claims
title but has no color to sustain his claim, his possession reaches no
further than there is a pedis possessio ; but if he has a colorable
title, his actual occupancy of a part is constructively extended to
embrace the whole of the tract described in the instrument giving
color: 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th ed.) 137. The chief office, then,
of color of title is to give constructive possession. And, as we
shall see hereafter, it always includes claim of title; though the
converse of this proposition would not be true.
Now a claim, founded on color of title may, by force of the statute
of limitations, ripen into a complete title, which will enable him in
whom it is vested, if plaintiff, to maintain an action of ejectment,
or if defendant, to defeat it. The importance of the subject lies in
the fact that adverse possession, to mature into an actual title, must
have commenced under color or claim of title. -
It should also be premised that the courts have generally con-
curred in attaching. no exclusive or peculiar character or importance
to the ground of the invalidity of an apparent or colorable title;
the inquiry has always been, whether there was an apparent or
colorable title, under which an entry or a claim hag been made in
good faith: Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 56.
If. Written Instrument not BEssential.-It may appear somewhat
paradoxical to assert that a written instrument is not essential to
color of title, but an examination of the authorities will show this
to be the case. As above stated, the chief office of color of title
is to extend the possession, constructively, beyond the actual occu-
pation to the full limits of the claim. And it is evident that this
result may well be accomplished without the aid of papers. Hence,
notwithstanding some difference of opinion, it may be stated as a
fair conclusion from the decisions that color of title may exist with-
out any instrument purporting to convey title, provided always that
there is a bona fide claim of title and some record or some public
and notorious act, such as a survey, whereby the precise extent of
the claim is defined and with reference to which it is made. Thus,
in the case of HoeClellan v. Kellogg, 17 Ill. 501, ScATES, C. J.,
observes: "Color may be given for title without a deed or writing
at all, and commence in trespass ; and when founded upon a writing,
it is not essential that it should show upon its face a prima facie
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title, but that it may be good as a foundation for color, however
defective.- 'See also La Frambois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589; Jack-
son v. Oamp, 1 Id. 605; Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 180 ; Jackson
v. Wheat, 18 Id. 40; falson v. Fry, 1 Watts 433 ; Bell Yv. Hartly,
4 W. & S. 32; Frederick v. Searle, 5 S. & R. 236; Hawk v.
Senseman, 6 Id. 21 ; Xille v. Shaw, 7 Id. 129 ; Boyer v. Benlow,
10 Id. 303; Dufour v. (Iamfranc, 11 Mart. 715; Whiteside v.
Singleton, Meigs 207. "When a party is in possession pursuant
to a state of facts which in themselves show the character and extent
of his entry and claim, the case is entirely different, and such facts,
whatever they may be in a given case, perform sufficiently the office
of color of title. They evidence the character of the entry and the
extent of the claim, and no colorable title does more." Bell v.
Longsworth, 6 Ind. 273. And see Van Cleave v. Milliken, 13
Id. 105; Sumner v. Stevens, 6 Met. 337; Ashley v. Ashley, 4
Gray 197; St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593; 21cCall v. _Weeley,
3 Watts 69; .Rannels v. Bannels, 52 Mo. 112. But still it isvery
necessary that there should be some visible acts, signs or indications,
which are apparent to all, showing the extent of the boundaries of
the land claimed, to amount to color of title. Cooper v. Ord, 60
Mo. 431.
Color of title, however, in the large majority of cases where it
has been defined by the courts, or where its requisites and charac-
teristics have been called in question, has been based on some written
instrument. In our further discussion, therefore, it will be under-
stood that color of title resting in documents is meant, unless other-
wise specified.
III. Instrument must purport to convey Title.-It is clear that
a written instrument cannot constitute color of title unlesd it pur-
ports or professes to convey the title. According to the definition,
it must carry on its face the semblance or appearance of a transfer
of the legal title. Hence a mere executory contract or bond to
convey will not ordinarily give color of title. Such an instrument
does not profess to convey ; it only promises to convey. Dunlap
v. Daugherty, 20 Ill. 404; Rigor v. Frye, 62 Id. 507; Kilburn
v. Ilitchie, 2 Cal. 145; Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116; King
v. Travis, 4 Heyw. 280. So a title bond from A. to B., taken by
B. for the benefit of C., but never assigned to him, is not a sufficient
color of title in 0. to enable him, claiming thereunder, to perfect a
title by the Statute of Limitations. Green v. Kersey, 32 Ga. 152.
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It is upon this principle also that we must understand the decisions
to the effect that a certificate of purchase of real estate at its sale
for non-payment of taxes, cannot give color of title. Bride v. Watt,
23 Ill. 507; McKeighan v. Hopkins, 14 Neb. 361. Irrespective
of the question whether the tax sale was authorized by law, and
whether all the statutory requirements have been complied with or
not, the tax certificate does not convey the title, nor even purport
to do so. It merely establishes a peculiar species of equity or lien
in favor of the purchaser. It assures him that if certain steps shall
not have been taken by the owner before a designated future time,
he will then be entitled to apply for and to obtain a deed, which
last named instrument will convey to him the title. Evidently,
therefore, if the purchaser omits to take out his tax deed, the certi-
ficate cannot avail him as color of title.
This rule-that the instrument must profess to convey in presenti
-does not mean that the title must purport, when traced back to
its source, to be an apparently legal title, but only that the parti-
cular document relied on must profess to convey a title to the
grantee: Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 183.
IV. Possession limited by Description in Deed.-Color of title,
as above stated, extends the possession, by construction, to the full
limits of the estate. But a deed or other written instrument can-
not give color of title to anything lying beyond the limits of the
tract which, by the description, it purports to convey : Woods v.
Banks, 14 N. H. 101; McRae v. Williams, 7 Jones (N. C.) 480;
Bin hman v. Whetstone, 28 Ill. 185. Thus, where a deed pur-
ported to convey two lots by their numbers, the plat and stakes
showing the precise location, but the description including six feet
on another lot, it was held to give color of title to the entire lots as
shown by the plat and stakes, which prevail over distances: Bolden
v. Sherman, 110 Ill. 418.
V. Examples of Instruments giving Color of Title.-Among
the most usual examples of written instruments which have been
held to give a colorable title, we may mention decrees of a court
which ought to have been followed by private conveyances, but were
not, and private conveyances, regular in themselves, executed in
pursuance of voidable or void decrees. These answer exactly to
the definition and requirements of color of title, "and possession held
under them will ripen into a perfect title if the running of the
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statdte be not interrupted. For instance, where a decree directing
partition of land held in common was rendered, and a division was
made setting apart to each tenant in common his portion in sever-
alty, which division was reported to the court and approved, -but
deeds were not interchangeably made so as to complete .the pai'ti-
tion and vest the legal title in the portions'assignfed to each in
severalty, and afterwards one of the tenants remained in possession
and paid taxes on the portion' allotted to him, it was held that he
was in under color of title: Ghickering v. Paile, 38 Ill. 342. So,
the possession of lands under a guardian's conveyance, made pur-
suant to a void decree of the probate court for their sale, is sup-
ported by color of title and is adverse: Molten v. .Henderson, 62
Ala. 426. See Whiteside v. Singleton, 1 Meigs 207. A will also
constitutes color of title, and if accompanied with possession for the
necessary length of time will mature into a complete title: Trus-
tees v. Blount, 2 Tayl. 13. A grant from the state, purporting to be
made in obedience to acts of the General Assembly providing for
the relief of persons whose title-deeds had been destroyed by the
burning of the court house of a particular county, will furnish color
of title: Kron v.- Hinson; 8 Jones (N. C.) 347. Compare Oliver
v. Pullam, 24 Fed. Repr. 127. But the greatest number of de-
cisions under the general topic have been concerned with the effect
of deeds, private or official, and we now pass to the cbnsideration
of these cases.
VI. Deeds Private and Official.-And, first, an unregistered
deed is sufficient to constitute color of title : Lea v. Copper Co.,
21 How. 493 ; Minot v. Brooks, 16 N. H. 374 ; Hardin v. Bar-
rett, 6 Jones (N. C.)159. But in Georgia it is held that this will
not be the case unless proof of the execution of the .deed is
adduced: Hightower v. Williams, 38 Ga. 597. Again, a deed
purporting to be executed by virtue of a power of attorney from
the owner of the land, which power is not proved, affords
sufficient color of title on which to found an adverse possession, if
there has been a good constructive occupation under it : Munro v.
Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9; 1n re Brackett, Petitioner, 53 Me. 228;
Hill v. Wilton, 2 Murph. 14. So a forged deed is good to give
color of title under the statute to a bona. fide holder : Griffln v.
Stamper, 17 Ga. 108. And the defect in a deed of real estate
which has but one subscribing witness is cured by an adverse pos-
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session under it during the requisite length of time : Eyles v. Kirk-
patrick, 9 S. 0. 265. 'A deed of mortgaged premises, absolute on
its face, and purporting to convey the title to the land described in
it, executed by a mortgagor to the mortgagee, for a sufficient con-
sideration, is color of title: .Me agg v. .Heacock, 42 Ill. 153.
Again, a deed which is fraudulent as to the grantor's creditors is
voidable only, and therefore gives the grantee color of title :
Harper v. Tapley, 35 Miss. 506. So, where a grantor takes a deed
accidentally executed to him by a wrong name, and enters into pos-
session under it, it will constitute color of title: -Elston v. Kennicott,
46 Ill. 187. If real estate is held in common, and one tenant as-
sumes to convey the entire land, or any specific part of it by metes
and bounds, his deed will furnish color of title, and possession held
under it during the prescribed term will be adverse to the title of
the co-tenants, and will bar their right to recover the land con-
veyed: Weisinger v. Mztrphy, 2 Head 674. Compare Saunders
v. Silvey, 55 Tex. 46. On similar principles, a married woman's
deed, defective for want of privy examination, is an assurance of
title sufficient to protect an adverse holder : Hanks v. Fol-
som, 11 Lea 555 ; Try v. Baker, 59 Tex. 404 ; Watson v. Mancill,
76 Ala. 600. But there must be a party grantor, as well as a
grantee, to furnish color of title. Hence, a colorable title cannot
be obtained by a deed from commissioners of highways who cannot,
in any case, be grantors: Pittsbuxgh, etc., Rd. v. Reich, 101 Ill.
157.
A deed made by a master in chancery, or clerk, after he goes
out of office, on a sale made by him while in office, is good as color
of title though not otherwise operative: Williams v. Council, 4
Jones (N. 0.) 206. So a sheriff's deed, without producing the
judgment and execution under which the land was sold, is sufficient
to show the character of the grantee who claims under it, and
renders his possession adverse: Biggs v. -Dooley, 7 B. Mon. 236;
Sutton v. MeEoud, 26 Ga: 638. And it is also held that a sheriff's
deed will give color of title though founded on a void or voidable
judgment. "As a foundation of title," say the court, "it is
worthless, by reason of the void judgment in which it had its
inception. We are not, however, considering it as a medium for
the conveyance of title. An adverse claimant of land is a wrong-
doer, and as such is treated and known to the law, until, by the
lapse of years, his acts, before tortious, are consecrated by time and
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dignified as lawful :" Packard v. Moss, (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1885), 21
Reporter 552. An administrator's deed, void as against heirs for
want of notice, they being minors, will give color of title, under
which, if the premises be held adversely during the statutory period
after the heirs attain their majority, their right of action will be
barred: Vancleave v. Milliken, 13 Ind. 105; Root v. llcFerrin,
37 Miss. 17.
VII. Tax Deeds.-In regard to tax deeds, as furnishing color
of title, the law is somewhat peculiar. It should be remembered,
in the first place, that the power to sell land for the non-payment
of taxes is a naked power, not coupled with an interest; that every
step in the proceedings must be taken with strict regard to an exact
compliance with the statutory requirements, or else the sale will be
invalid; that the burden is on the tax purchaser to prove such
compliance; and that, unless made so by express statute, 'a tax deed
is not evidence of any fact whatever, except, perhaps, its own
existence. Now if there be no statute to make a tax deed prima
facie evidence, it may well be doubted whether it would, of itself,
amount to color of title. For the party relying upon a tax sale
would be called upon (in ejectment for example,) to prove the pre-
liminary steps, such as the assessment and levy of taxes, the return
of the land as delinquent, the notice of its sale, the actual sale, and
so on, and in the apparent regularity of these proceedings would be
found his color of title, rather than in the deed which could not be
brought into evidence until they had been prima facie established.
But if the statute makes the tax deed original evidence of title, or
of the regularity of the anterior proceedings, the case is otherwise.
Under such circumstances it is well settled that, although the tax
sale be irregular or invalid, yet the collector's deed, in connection
with proof of the actual possession of the land by the purchaser
and those claiming under him, during the whole period of limita-
tion, is a sufficient foundation for a complete prescriptive title:
Elliott v. Pearce, 20 Ark. 508; Cofer v. Brooks, Id. 542; Finlay
v. Cook, 54 Barb. 9; Dillingham v. Brown, 88 Ala. 811; Hol-
lowat v. Clark, 27 Ill. 483; Hardin v. Crate, 78 Id. 588. Thus,
possession of land in good faith may well be under a sufficient color
of title, though it be founded on a tax sale not preceded by any
advertisement thereof: Doe v. Ilearick, 14 Ind. 242. Or although
the description of the property in the deed is defective: Childs v.
Shower, 18 Iowa 261. Or although the judgment on which the
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sale was based was fatally defective: Baily v. Doolittle, 24 Ill.
577. But a mere sale of land by a tax collector, without any deed,
it is said, will give the purchaser no color of title: Anvan v. Baker,
49 N. H. 161. And a deed of land sold for taxes, made neither
to the purchaser nor the assignee of the certificate of purchase, to
whom alone it is authorized to be made, will not lay the foundation
for a colorable title: Childress v. Calloway, 76 Ala. 128. And it
is to be noted that the claimant of land under a tax deed has color
of title only from the date of the deed and not from the day of the
sale: DeGraw v. Taylor, 37 Mo. 310.
VIII. Tax Deed T'oid on its Face.-We have taken it for
granted, in the preceding section, that the tax deed alleged as
constituting color of title, was regular on its face and apparently
legal and valid. But where the deed shows upon its face that it is
void and worthless, a question of greater difficulty arises. It is
the settled doctrine of several of the states, that a tax deed void on
its face can by no means serve as color of title: Shoat v. Walker,
6 Kans. 65 ; Sapp v. Nforrill, 8 Id. 677; Wofford v. NfeKinna,
23 Tex. 86; Cain v. Hunt, 41 Ind. 466; Arrowsmith v. Burlin-
gim, 4 McLean 489; Keefe v. Bramhall, 3 Mackey 551. These
decisions proceed, for the most part, upon the ground that if the
instrument discloses its own invalidity, there can be no good faith
on the part of the claimant; he must be aware of the nullity of his
own claim, and hence his possession cannot be considered hostile in
such sense that it may ripen into an indefeasible title. On the
other hand, it is the accepted view in Wisconsin, that when the
protection of the special statute of limitations is invoked, it is im-
material whether the tax deed be valid or void, or informal or
defective in substance. It will in any event give color of title.
And these decisions are based upon the consideration that if it
were necessary for the party to produce a regular deed and prove
compliance with all the preliminary requisites, the statute would be
simply unnecessary. and futile. It would benefit him not the least:
-Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527 ; Bill v. Kricke, Id. 442; Sjprecker
v. Wakeley, 11 Id. 432; Oconto Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Id. 317; Me-
Afillan v. Wekle, 55 Id. 685 ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black (U.
S.) 599. Thus, in -Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527, Judge COLE
observes: "The possession and occupation seem to have been
actual, continuous and notorious under the tax deed, and as a mat-
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ter of course hostile to the title of the true owner. But it was
insisted upon the argument of the cause by the counsel for the plain-
tiff, that the tax deed is void upon its face, and there.tre was no
evidence of colorable title ; for it is said, to constitute adverse pos-
session, the person actually holding must claim in good faith under
a title hostile to the title of the real owner; that the court must
determine, by an inspection of the deed or other evidence of title,
whether the claim of title was hostile or adverse; and if it ap-
peared that the title, paper or contract was not in the nature and
form of a conveyance, but showed upon its face that it was a nul-
lity,' the -claim of title under such an instrument could not be
adverse, the presumption being that the person holding knew
whether the title paper on its face was good or not, and if it was
not adequate to carry the true title, it was evidence of bad faith in
the one claiming under it. Although the cases on adverse posses-
sion and the statutes of limitation are numerous in the books, it is
not always easy to ascertain tud determine what is meant by the
phrase 'color of title.' In the case of Wright v. Mllattison, 18
How. 50, the court, upon this subject, says: 'The courts have
concurred, it is believed without an exception, in defining color of
title to be that which in appearance is title, but which in reality is
no title. They have equally concurred in attaching no exclusive or
peculiar character or importance to the ground of the invalidity of
an apparent or colorable title; the inquiry with them has been,
whether there has been an apparent or colorable title under which
an entry or'claim has been made in good faith.' * * * We are
of the opinion that the tax deed is sufficient to show color of title in
Bird, within the doctrine of the case of Wright v. M2fattison, and
many other well considered cases found in the reports, without
regard to its intrinsic worth as a title, or the informality iih its ex-
ecution."
And this view is sustained by a humber of decisions from other
states, constituting, perhaps, the majority in weight: Chicago, 4C.,
Railroad v. Aifree, 64 Iowa 500; Pugh v. Youngblood, 69 Ala.
296; Gatling v. Lane, (Sup. Ct. Nebr. 1885), 19 Reporter 344
Johnson v. Elwood, 53 N. Y. 434 ; Dalton v. Lucas, 63 Ill. 337;
Stovallv. Powler, 72 Ala. 77.
The" United States Supreme Court, in the case of ]Jioore v.
Brown, 11 How. 414, held that a tax deed void upon its face does
not give such color of title as to sustain the bar of the special
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statute of limitations provided for actions concerning tax titles.
But WAYNE, J., who delivered the opinion of the majority of the
court, said : " We do not put the conclusion upon the point exclu-
sively upon the fact that it is a void deed, but that it is so, being a
deed made in violation of law." And TANEY, 0. J., and CATRON,
J., dissented, on the ground that such a construction of the statute
would be directly subversive of its intention, and would render it
nugatory. And in a subsequent case (Pillow v. Boberts, 13 How.
472), the same court observed : " Color of title, even under a void
and worthless deed, has always been received as evidence that the
person in possession claims for himself, and of course adversely to
all the world."
IX. Good Faith of Claimant, how far .laterial.-In order
to arrive at definite conclusions in regard to the effect of an instru-
ment which discloses its own invalidity, as giving color of title, it
will be necessary to take into account the good or bad faith of the
claimant, and ascertain what effect that will have upon the posses-
sion. And here we shall be aided by a comparison of the doctrines
of the Roman law with our own. By the Roman systems, a dis-
tinction was made between the corpus and the animus of possession;
the former indicating merely the actual fact of occupation, and the
latter referring to the intention (with regard to ownership) with
which it was held. And prescription could not confer a complete
title unless the intention of the possessor was to claim the thing
as his own. This distinction is also found in the English law.
For, says a distinguished writer, " this intent to claim and possess
the land is one of the qualities essential to constitute a disseisin.
A mere going upon the land by any one, and staying there without
the intent to claim and assert the land to be his own, would not
operate as an ouster. The intention guides the entry and fixes its
character :" 3 Washb. Real Prop., 4th ed., 139. Again, by the
principles of the civil law, "possession must be founded upon a
justus titulus ; that is, upon some occurrence or event which would
produce the conviction in a person that he was the owner. The
titulus must be justus, that is, an event per se must have occcurred
sufficient to pass property. This event must also be verus, that is
to say, the legal.transaction upon which this condition is based must
have been actually concluded. The possessor must, by a justus titu-
lus, have the conviction of being the dominus (bona fides). This
honest belief must be founded upon probable error (error factipro-
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babilis), and must have existed from the very commencement:"
Tomkins & Jencken, Mod. Rom. Law 160. And see Mackeldey's
Rom. Law, § 289 ; 1. 11 Dig. 41-4 ; 1. 5, § 1, Dig. 41, 10. This
means, as we understand it, that the claimant's belief in his title is
erroneous-else he would have no need to invoke the aid of pre-
scription-but such belief must in fact exist, and the error must be
an excusable one, an error that any prudent man might make.
And there seems to be sufficient authority in our 5wn law for stat-
ing that if the grantee knows that the deed conveys no title, it will
not avail him as color: Wateriwuse v. Martin, Peck. 392 ; Saxton
v. Hunt, 20 N. J. L. 487 ; Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115. "In
order that a claimant be entitled to a presumptive occupancy to the
extent of the claimed boundary, he must enter and occupy under
the belief that his title is good :" Davidson v. Coombs (Ct. of App.
Ky.) 18 Reporter 15 ; Nieto v. ( arpenter, 21 Cal. 455.
As the result of the authorities, we should be inclined to state
the rule in this manner: A void deed, or other written instrument,
will not serve as color of title if the ground of its invalidity is so
apparent on its face that a person of ordinary prudence and expe-
rience could not be held excusable for failing to discover it. And
this is, in effect, the conclusion reached by LUTMPKIN, J., in" Bever-
ly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 443, where he says: "Color of title may be de-
fined to be a writing, upon its face professing to pass title, but
which does not do it, either from want of title in the person mak-
ing it, or from the defective conveyance that is used-a title that is
imperfect, but not so obviously that it would be apparent to one not
skilled in the law."
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